According to St. Thomas, the two metaphysical Socrates have come to pose a universal cause of all entities, or not? Aquinas, as we know, has not always given the same answer to this problem. The most important stages of his thinking in this regard are as follows.
Quaestiones in De potentia disputatae that the P. Torrell Roman traces the academic year 1265 - 1266 [1] , egli afferma che:
Posteriores vero philosophi ut Plato, Aristoteles et eorum sequaces, pervenerunt ad considerationem ipsius esse universalis; et ideo ipsi soli posuerunt aliquam universalem causam rerum, a qua omnia alia in esse prodirent, ut patet per Augustinum [2] .
Si dà quindi credito a Platone ed Aristote di aver tematizzato l’ente nella sua universalità - che sembra essere lo «ente in quanto ente» che funge da soggetto della Metafisica Aristotle - and hence to be come to put some universal cause of things. Note the restriction aliquam , which probably alludes to the diversity, and also to the insufficiency of A Well-Platonic or Aristotelian prime mover. Nevertheless, the finding implies that the two chief thomas Greek metaphysicians have discovered a universal cause of the institution.
Soon after, in Ia pars , after the De potentia according Torrell, the look appare diverso:
Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem.
Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt.
Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens: et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium [3] .
some time, it was noted that the position of Plato and Aristotle seems to be undervalued compared to De potentia . The two seem to be limited to the more Socratic resolutio of ens Asthe is this ( particular thing - τόδε τι), or is this Asthe ( this ) in such a manner that did not exceed the threshold of the essence or form in place. Other ( ulterius aliquo), which are not named, would be in solving the agency precisely because it is body, and found God in all that lies in their total reality.
It seems hard to deny that Thomas has subsequently changed its assessment of Greek metaphysics, even if the text of Summa theologiae is much more complex than the De potentia . In the latter, is attributed to Plato and Aristotle to the consideration of these universal and the cause from which all things in them prodirent , in that, however, says they have been limited to hoc ens / that ens , which awarded the causae agentes particulares.
A third text, one can perhaps not mentioned, is the latest reflection of Aquinas on this issue. This is Chapter 9 of De substantiis separatis , Torrell see that the later half of 1271 [4] , and offers its mediation between the two opposing positions before:
Paulatim enim humana ingenia processisse videntur ad investigandam rerum originem […].
Posteriores vero philosophi ulterius processerunt, resolventes sensibiles substantias in partes essentiae, quae sunt materia et forma: et sic fieri rerum naturalium in quadam transmutatione posuerunt, secundum quod materia alternatim diversis formis subiicitur.
Sed ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est, secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis, ponere alium altiorem. Cum enim necesse sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc modo esse ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut supra habitum est, necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia. Oportet igitur communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus huiusmodi fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est, et in suum esse. Oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod esse attribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente, quod est suum esse [5] .
Questa volta, il giudizio su Platone ed Aristotele viene diviso in due momenti. Si attribuisce nuovamente a loro, come nella Summa theologiae , la resolutio delle sostanze sensibili nei loro co-principi essenziali, materia e forma. Poi si accede ad un modus fiendi superiore, che non è altro che la creazione, tramite la resolutio dell’ente nello id quod est e nello esse , cioè fra lo ens e lo esse grazie al quale lo ens è, sboccando quindi su ciò che dopo Heidegger, ma non in senso heideggeriano, chiamiamo «differenza ontologica». In effetti, l’ente è, ma non è uguale al proprio atto di essere, all’unica eccezione di Dio. Tale differenza viene fondata nella partecipazione, per la quale ogni ente che non è Dio partecipa all’Essere di Dio, che non può che essere unico. Ora questa seconda ed ultima resolutio , che è propria di san Tommaso, viene effettuata secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis , vale a dire secondo i principi elaborati dai due socratici, anche se non si trova de facto nei loro testi. Questa formula spiazza in anticipo tante discussioni sull’aristotelismo di san Tommaso, ed adirittura su quello di Aristotele:
- San Tommaso vede quindi la propria posizione continuity with speculative metaphysics in Aristotle and Plato as well, "secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis' at the same time, he was aware of the historical limitations of the two Socratic metaphysics, the end does not go much beyond the analysis of the essence of 'sensitive institution. Thus, both Plato and Aristotle profess doctrines open to transcendence of ipsum they subsistens : the first, thanks to the doctrine of participation, and the second to that act, and yet also of the essence that is the measure of ε ἶ ναι, present in the famous formula τ ὸ τί ἦ ν ε ἶ ναι, but not explored. But others were, in reality, especially the St. Thomas to take the path that leads to the full elucidation of the institution.
- This assessment also contains a crystal-clear and simple criterion for the interpretation of Aristotle: his philosophical development is not enclosed in a physical / metaphysical forms in place, as many commentators argue, also rightly famous [6] , but is inherently open to them , and almost been waiting for this development.
seem particularly urgent and desirable that the metaphysics rediscover the profound sense of this just speculation Aristotelianism of Aquinas, which goes beyond the letter of Aristotle, but it never contradicts what he says.
[1] Cf J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin , Cerf - Éditions Universitaires de Fribourg, Paris – Fribourg (Suisse) 1993, 489.
[2] QD De potentia , q. 3 a . 5c.
[3] ST I, q. 44 a . 2c.
[4] Cf. J.-P. Torrel , op. cit. , 510.
[5] De substantiis separatis , c. 9.
[6] for example, through large G. Royal , who wrote in The concept of first philosophy and the unity of Aristotle's Metaphysics , 5th ed., Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1993, 444: "Being designated a original multiplicity. Outside of this multiplicity, be lost meaning: to be "pure" of Eleatics, and being "in se et per se" of Plato, who should be conceived outside or above, or at least in contrast the multiplicity of the real meaning of ' ὄ ν, mean nothing, because such ". For St. Thomas instead, they 'meanings! Completum aliquid et simplex sed non subsistens (QD De potentia, q. 1 to . 1c).
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